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testimony is sought to be taken in Napa County reside in 
San Francisco, at the very place of trial, and are available 
therein as witnesses at any time. In view of that situation 
the question arises as to whether or not a party to an action 
may, in any event, require the attendance of a witness outside 
of the county in which he resides and wherein the action is 
pending, for the purpose of giving a deposition, even though 
the place where such witness is required to attend be less 
than fifty miles from his place of residence.'' (Pp. 392-393.) 
This is exactly the situation which is presented by the peti-
tion of \V emyss. 
Pollak was obliged to obey the subpoena issued by the 
Superior Court of Napa County because, "in view of the 
broad language of said section 2021 of said code, it would 
seem that authority is granted to take depositions in any 
county, irrespective of the place where the witness resides 
or the place wherein the action is pending, provided only 
the distance between the place of residence of said witness 
and the place where his deposition shall be taken be less than 
fifty miles." (Pp. 393-394.) This is directly contrary to 
the determination of the same question in the present case. 
[L. A. No. 19306. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.] 
SOUTHWESTERN INVESTMENT CORPORATION (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 
Respondent. 
[1] Appeal-Remittitur-RecalL-Other than for the correction 
of clerical errors, the recall of a remittitur may be ordered 
on the ground of fraud, mistake or inadvertence; the recall 
may not be granted to correct judicial error. 
[2] !d.-Remittitur-Recall-Time of Application.-A motion to 
recall a remittitur must be promptly made; while preparation 
of voluminous notes and attempts to engage attorneys might 
excuse a reasonable delay, unsuccessful attempts to invoke 
other means of redress, such as persuading a city council to 
act voluntarily in the matter in question, appealing to local 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 633; Am.Jur., Appeal and 
Error, § 1263. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3-5, 7, 8] Appeal and Error, § 1773; 
[2] Appeal and Error, § 1779; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1775. 
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newspapers, etc., do not excuse a delay of more than three 
and a half years in filing the motion. 
[3] Id.-Remittitur-Recall.-On appeal from judgment for de-
fendant city in an action to establish a trust for dumping 
rights in a pit, opinion of District Court of Appeal that trial 
court correctly determined that executed instruments clearly 
conveyed entire title and possessory rights to city was not 
based on a misapprehension of the facts, so as to entitle 
plaintiff to recall of remittitur sent by appellate court to 
lower court, where there was no fraud or imposition, no mis-
taken assumption of the existence or nonexistence of a fact 
of record or otherwise, and no inconsistency between a finding 
of the trial court that plaintiff first obtained the exclusive 
possessory rights in the pit and a finding that ultimately the 
city had those rights by virtue of quitclaim deeds from plaintiff. 
[ 4] Id.-Remittitur-Recall.-An appellate court has no appellate 
jurisdiction of its own judgment; it has no power to recall a 
remittitur for the purpose of reconsidering or modifying its 
judgment on the merits. 
[5] Id.-Remittitur-Recall.-Extraordinary remedy by motion to 
recall a remittitur may be invoked only in cases of fraud or 
imposition practiced on the court or on the opposite party, 
or where the judgment was based on a mistake of fact or 
occurred through inadvertence; none of these is present when 
the court renders the judgment advisedly on the case as 
presented by the parties. 
[6] !d.-Remittitur-Recall-Mistake or Inadvertence.-Mistake 
or inadvertence, as ground for recall of a remittitur, is not 
supported by a declaration that on presentation of the same 
facts and matters in issue the court now arrives at a different 
conclusion on the merits. 
[7] Id.-Remittitur-Recall.-A motion to recall a remittitur is 
not justified as an opportunity to the parties to relitigate their 
cause nor to the appellate court to redetermine the merits. 
[8] Id.-Remittitur-Recall.-Where a motion to the District 
Court of Appeal to recall a remittitur issued by it was im-
properly granted, the correct disposition, after petition for 
hearing was granted by the Supreme Court, is to return the 
proceeding to the District Court of Appeal with directions 
to deny the motion, thereby rendering unnecessary the con-
sideration or disposition of a petition for a writ of prohibition 
except to deny it. 
MOTION to recall remittitur. Motion retransferred to Dis-
trict Court of Appeal with directions to deny it; writ of 
prohibition denied. 
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SHENK, J.-On January 28, 1946, the District Court of 
Appeal, Second District, Division One, affirmed a judgment 
adverse to the plaintiff, Southwestern Investment Corpora-
tion, in an action to establish a resulting trust by virtue of 
certain transactions had with the defendant, City of Los 
Angeles. (72 Cal.App.2d 689 [165 P.2d 497].) A petition 
for rehearing was denied on February 14, 1946. A petition 
for hearing in this court was denied on March 28, 1946. 
The remittitur issued and was filed in the superior court 
on April 2, 1946. 
On November 3, 1950, the plaintiff filed in the District 
Court of Appeal a notice of motion to recall the remittitur 
and reinstate the cause. The motion was grounded on mis-
apprehension of the facts and on inadvertence caused by 
fraud or imposition on the court. The motion was granted 
on September 12, 1951, on the ground of the court's mis-
apprehension of the facts when it rendered the prior deci-
sion. The defendant filed in this court a petition for hearing 
and a petition for the writ of prohibition. On November 8, 
1951, the petition for hearing was granted. 
The petition for hearing was granted because of a serious 
doubt arising as to whether the effect of the granting of 
the motion was in fact to cure an inadvertence or mistake 
of the court or was merely to correct judicial error. The 
sufficiency of the explanation to excuse the delay in making 
the motion was also considered to require investigation. The 
opinion on its face was deemed insufficient to justify the 
order and might create a dangerous precedent, as will appear 
from the following discussion. 
As is quite usual in such cases, the moving party seeks a 
modification of the judgment. In this case the plaintiff seeks 
a modification by correction of the trial court's findings to 
accord with the asserted facts, and a reversal of the adverse 
judgment with possible directions to enter judgment in its 
favor. 
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That a remittitur may be recalled on the reviewing court's 
own motion, on motion or petition after notice supported by 
affidavits, or on stipulation setting forth the facts which 
will justify the granting of the order is now determined 
by rule. (Rule 25(d), Rules on Appeal; 36 Cal.2d at p. 22.) 
The question as to when the facts constitute grounds for 
the granting of the motion is resolved by the case law. 
[1] Other than for the correction of clerical errors, the 
recall may be ordered on the ground of fraud, mistake or 
inadvertence. The recall may not be granted to correct 
judicial error. (Rowland v. Kreyenhagen, 24 Cal. 52, 59; 
Trumpler v. Trumpler, 123 Cal. 248, 252-253 [55 P. 1008] ; 
Estate of Ross, 189 Cal. 317, 318 [207 P. 1014]; Isenberg 
v. Sherman, 214 Cal. 722, 725-726 [7 P.2d 1006] ; In re Roth-
rock, 14 Cal.2d 34, 38-39 [92 P.2d 634] ; In re McGee, 37 
Cal.2d 6, 8-9 [229 P.2d 780]; Haydel v. Morton, 28 Cal.App. 
2d 383, 385 [82 P.2d 623] ; Chaney v. Los Angeles County 
Etc. Retirement Board, 61 Cal.App.2d 701, 703 [143 P.2d 
707] ; Ellenberger v. City of Oakland, 76 Cal.App.2d 828, 
830 [174 P.2d 461] .) In the McGee case it was pointed 
out that a decision is inadvertent if it is the result of over-
sight, neglect or accident, as distinguished from judicial 
error. In Chin Ott Wong v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 91 
Cal.App.2d 1 [204 P.2d 387], an order recalling the remit-
titur was vacated when on analysis it appeared that the 
purpose of the recall was merely to amend the judgment 
on appeal. 
The salient facts (given in greater detail in 72 Cal.App.2d 
689) which were before the court on the appeal are the fol-
lowing: 
Henry G. W eyse formerly owned approximately 15 acres 
at Washington Boulevard and Alameda Street in Los An-
geles which formed a depression about 400 feet wide known 
as the Diamond Pit. In May, 1927, Weyse gave to the 
plaintiff corporation on a 50 per cent royalty basis the ex-
clusive leasehold right to use the pit for dumping purposes. 
On November 22, 1929, Weyse deeded to the city for a con-
sideration of $175,000 a 90-foot right of way (later amended 
to 90 feet and the necessary slopes) through the pit for the 
purpose of extending Washington Boulevard. W eyse granted 
a temporary easement around the southerly side of the pit 
for rerouting \Vashington Boulevard. Through various writ-
ten negotiations had among the plaintiff, the city and the 
Board of Public \Vorks, grant deeds to the remaining acre-
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age passed through escrow from W eyse to the city; and 
quitclaim deeds containing no reservations or exceptions 
were executed to the city by the plaintiff upon payment of 
$8,500. At some time during the transactions delinquent 
taxes and penalties to the extent of about $32,000 were can-
celled. (See City of Los Angeles v. Ford, 12 Cal.2d 407 
[84 P.2d 1042] .) The deeds, which provided for reversion-
ary interests when the fill was completed, were accepted by 
the city on November 26, 1935. On December 18, 1935, 
the Board of Public Works wrote to the plaintiff giving 
consent to the use by the plaintiff of the southerly portion 
of the pit for dumping purposes. This consent was with-
out authorization by the city, and on June 10, 1936, the 
city evicted (the plaintiff says "ejected") the plaintiff from 
the pit. 
On December 18, 1938, the plaintiff commenced the action 
to impress a trust in the nature of a resulting trust on the 
defendant to protect the dumping rights which it alleged 
were retained by virtue of the transactions involved. The 
trial court's judgment determined that the city acquired 
a fee title and all rights of ownership and possession in 
and to the pit, and that the cause was barred by laches. 
The plaintiff appealed on a settled statement. In the de-
cision on appeal the court noted that fraud was not an issue 
in the case, that the pleadings contained no allegations of 
mistake, and that the plaintiff did not seek cancellation or 
reformation of the instruments in question. The plaintiff 
sought to base its cause for impressing a trust of its dump-
ing rights upon representations and negotiations occurring 
prior to the execution of the deeds executed by the plain-
tiff, which were had not with the city council but with mem-
bers of the Board of Public Works and the city engineer. 
The court pointed out facts indicating that the plaintiff 
was aware before executing the deeds that there could not 
be amendment of the escrow instructions to reserve its dump-
ing rights without authorization by the city council. The 
court held that without reformation, the nature of the title 
acquired was determined by the clear and unambiguous 
language of the instruments and not by the declarations 
of the parties in the negotiations or agreements otherwise; 
also that there was no instrument in the nature of a de-
feasance which could be considered a part of the transaction. 
Answering the plaintiff's contention that the quitclaim 
deeds were delivered solely to enable the city to obtain a 
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cancellation of the taxes, the court stated that there was 
no evidence to justify the conclusion or to rebut the pre-
sumption that official duty had been regularly performed. 
The court rejected the contention that the $8,500 considera-
tion received by the plaintiff was grossly inadequate in the 
absence of the issues of fraud, mistake or any of the grounds 
for cancellation or reformation of the instruments. The 
finding of laches was not considered because of the ade-
quacy of other grounds for determination of the issues on 
appeal. The court rejected as without merit additional con-
tentions in criticism of the findings and conclusions and 
the failure to find on material issues. The judgment of 
affirmance followed. 
More than three and a half years elapsed after the filing 
of the remittitur before the plaintiff sought to have it re-
called. An affidavit of its president was submitted on the 
motion, the major portion of which is devoted to an explana-
tion of why the plaintiff did not make the move sooner. The 
averments show that in this interim the affiant was attempt-
ing to invoke other means of redress to regain the plain-
tiff's dumping rights, such as by persuasion upon the city 
council voluntarily to act in the matter, and by appealing 
to local newspapers, organizations and citizens for support 
of an equitable claim pursued before the council. [2] Prep-
aration of voluminous notes and attempts to engage attor-
neys might excuse a reasonable delay. But time spent in 
the unsuccessful pursuit of nonjudicial redress does not 
excuse the failure to pursue the judicial course when the law 
requires that that course be initiated promptly. ( Cf. Ellen-
berger v. City of Oakland, S~{pra, 76 Cal.App.2d 828, 836.) 
In the Rothrock case (supra, 14 Cal.2d 34) the motion to 
recall the remittitur was granted about three years after 
the judgment on appeal became final, but the defendant 
had promptly and diligently invoked redress through the 
courts. There it appeared that the judgment of this court 
on the appeal was mistakenly based on the assumption that 
the defendant in the criminal prosecution had not made a 
motion for a new trial. The record showed otherwise and 
it became obvious that not to correct the court's mistake 
by amending the judgment would result in a gross injustice. 
[3] Unlike the Rothrock case the present situation does 
not involve the mistaken assumption of a procedural fact 
upon which the judgment of the court depended. Here the 
judgment of affirmance was based on the holding that the 
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trial court correctly determined that the executed instru-
ments were clear and unambiguous and conveyed the en-
tire title and possessory rights without any reservations or 
exceptions and under circumstances which did not admit 
of a resulting trust. On the motion to recall the remittitur 
the plaintiff sought to establish that the court decided the 
cause "under a misapprehension of the true facts." In the 
petition the plaintiff alleges inconsistencies in the findings of 
the trial court and supposed contradictions on the face of 
the opinion of the District Court of Appeal. It is unneces-
sary to take up seriatim the finding by finding and para-
graph by paragraph method adopted by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff's exposition indicates that if any so-called mis-
apprehension existed in the mind of the court, it was not 
produced by any fraud or imposition nor based on the mis-
taken assumption of the existence or nonexistence of a fact 
of record or otherwise. There is no inconsistency between 
the finding that in 1927 the plaintiff obtained the exclusive 
possessory rights in the Diamond Pit and the conclusion that 
ultimately the city had those possessory rights by virtue of 
the quitclaim deeds from the plaintiff. In view of the trial 
court's finding and the appellate court's holding of eviden-
tiary insufficiency, the plaintiff's insistence that these instru-
ments were executed solely to permit the city to obtain can-
cellation of the tax liens is of no avail on this motion. 
The documentary and other facts on which the plaintiff 
now relies were matters of record before the District Court 
of Appeal when it determined the points presented on the 
appeal. The asserted inconsistencies in the findings and 
contradictions in the opinion were presented to that court 
on a petition for rehearing and to this court on a petition 
for hearing. In sum and substance all that the plaintiff 
is now asking is that the District Court of Appeal reverse 
itself. [4] But an appellate court has no appellate juris-
diction of its own judgment; and it has no power to re-
call the remittitur for the purpose of reconsidering or modi-
fying its judgment on the merits. 
[5] The decisions above cited establish that the extraor-
dinary remedy by motion to recall the remittitur may be 
invoked only in cases of fraud or imposition practiced upon 
the court or upon the opposite party, or where the judgment 
was based on a mistake of fact or occurred through inadver-
tence. None of these is present when the court renders the 
judgment advisedly upon the case as presented by the par-
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ties. (Estate of Ross, supra, 189 Cal. 317, 318.) Here the 
court's asserted misapprehension of the evidentiary facts 
is not a ground of recall. There is no fraud. There is no 
mistake or inadvertence, such as in the Rothrock case where 
the court failed to note the existence of a fact of record 
which materially affected the result as distinguished from 
the determination on the merits. [6] Mistake or inad-
vertence is not supported by a declaration that on the pres-
entation of the same facts and matters in issue the court 
now arrives at a different conclusion on the merits. [7] A 
motion to recall the remittitur is not justified as an oppor-
tunity to the parties to relitigate their cause nor to the 
appellate court to redetermine the merits. The plaintiff used 
all the available opportunities for reconsideration of the 
cause. It may not now by the device of a motion to recall 
the remittitur secure an additional rehearing on the merits 
and thereby obtain a modification of the judgment or a dif-
ferent judgment. (Isenberg v. Sherman, supra, 214 Cal. 
722, 725; see, also, Chin Ott Wong v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 
supra, 91 Cal.App.2d 1, 2.) 
[8] It follows from the foregoing that the motion to re-
call the remittitur should be denied. But since the motion 
is to the District Court of Appeal, the correct disposition 
after petition for hearing granted is to return the proceed-
ing to that court with appropriate direction. (See Heroux 
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 14 Cal.2d 285 [93 P.2d 805] .) 
This course renders unnecessary the consideration or disposi-
tion of the petition for the writ of prohibition except to deny 
it. Accordingly the petition for the writ ·of prohibition is 
denied and the motion to recall the remittitur is retrans-
ferred to the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate 
District, Division One, with directions to deny the motion. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The majority opinion correctly states the rule as announced 
by the decisions of this court and the District Courts of Ap-
peal with respect to when a remittitur may be recalled, and 
it is in the application of the rule to the facts of the case 
at bar that I disagree with the majority. On the other 
hand, I agree with the views expressed in the opinion pre-
pared by Mr. Presiding Justice White when this case was 
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before the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate Dis-
trict, Division One ( '~ ( Cal.A pp.) 235 P .2d 388). 
'fhe line of cleavage between what constitutes mistake 
or inadvertence and judicial error is somewhat obscure and 
there would be little value in suggesting supposititious cases 
which would justfy the application of the rule. There are, 
however, cases in the reports which seem to me to go farther 
than we would be required to go in the instant case to sus-
tain the holding of the District Court of Appeal that the 
remittitur be recalled. In Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 
220 Cal. 295 [30 P.2d 30], this court was faced with a prob-
lem arising out of prior decisions of the District Court of 
Appeal in the same case. In that case the District Court of 
Appeal had rendered an opinion reversing the judgment 
(Crurn v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 117 Cal..App. 586 [4 
P.2d 564] ; Albaugh v. JJ1t. Shasta Power Corp., 117 Cal. 
A.pp. 612 [4 P.2d 574]) and a petition for hearing was denied 
by this court. Thereafter a motion to recall the remittitur 
was made in the District Court of Appeal and denied by 
opinion (Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 124 Cal.App. 90 
[12 P.2d 134]; Albaugh v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 124 
Cal.A.pp. 779 [ 12 P.2d 137]), and a petition for hearing 
was denied by this court. The case was then retried and 
judgment was again recovered by plaintiff, which judgment 
was reviewed by this court by its decision reported in 220 
Cal. 295 [ 30 P .2d 30]. Because of misstatements of both 
fact and law contained in the opinions of the District Court 
of .l1..ppeal, this court was confronted with the problem of 
reconciling irreconcilable conflicts in the law as declared by 
the District Court of Appeal in that case. This court pur-
ported to reconcile these conflicts by a process of reason-
ing which in effect nullified the holding of the District 
Court of Appeal on the basic legal theory upon which its 
decisions were rendered. Although the decisions of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal had become final and the rules of law 
therein announced had become the law of the case, this 
court was compelled to say that it could not accept the rules 
of law therein announced and decided the case in disre-
gard of those rules. 
Likewise, in the case of Greenfield v. Mather, 32 Cal.2d 23 
[194 P.2d 1], this court was required to hold that two prior 
decisions of this court in a companion case (Mather v. Mather, 
*A hearing by the Supreme Court was granted on Nov. 9, 1951. 
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22 Cal.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808], 25 Cal.2d 582 [154 P.2d 
684]) were erroneously decided because of a misapprehen-
sion of the facts, and that even though the judgments in 
those two prior decisions had become final, they could not 
be followed by this court and were not res adjudicata. 
I do not think it can be said that the mistakes made in 
both the Crum and Mather cases cannot be classified as judi-
cial error. In the Crum case the District Court of Appeal 
so garbled and misstated the facts that the rules of law 
which it applied could not be made applicable to the facts 
disclosed by the record, and when the case finally got be-
fore this court on the second appeal, and the true facts 
were stated, this court found it impossible to apply the rules 
of law which had been announced by the District Court of 
Appeal. There can be no doubt that the misstatement of 
the facts and the misapplication of the rules of law by the 
District Court of Appeal in that case amounted to judicial 
error. While this court had the opportunity to correct such 
error both on a petition for hearing after decision of the 
case on its merits, and on petition for hearing after denial 
of plaintiff's motion to recall the remittitur, it did not 
do so. So the responsibility for the judicial error involved 
in that case was cast upon this court as well as the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. In the Mather case the error con-
sisted of a misapprehension of the facts by this court. 
There can be no question but that such misapprehension 
was due to judicial inadvertence and amounted to judicial 
error. 
I can see no distinction in recalling a remittitur to cor-
rect such error or overruling or refusing to follow a prior 
decision of this court or of a District Court of Appeal in 
the same case regardless of whether we term the prior ad-
judication as the law of the case, res adjudicata, or stMe 
decisis. In other words, my theory is that if an appellate 
court makes a mistake in stating the facts of a case which 
results in a decision contrary to what should have been 
reached had the facts been correctly stated, it should have 
the power, and it is the duty of such court when the true 
facts are called to its attention, to recall the remittitur and 
render a decision in accordance with the correct state of 
facts. I believe this should be the rule regardless of whether 
the misstatement of fact in the prior decision is due to ig-
norance, caprice or fraud on the part of the court or the 
lawyers or litigants involved. 
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Fear that such a rule may have the effect of destroying 
the :finality of judgments and injuriously affecting rights 
of innocent third persons which may intervene between the 
erroneous decision and the recall of the remittitur, may be 
obviated by the recognition of the validity of any rights 
of innocent third parties which have intervened. Under 
this rule a court would not be faced with the unhappy di-
lemma of seeing justice thwarted because of its impotency 
to correct an error for which it alone is responsible. 
I would permit the decision of the District Court of Ap-
peal recalling the remittitur in this case to stand, to the 
end that it may reconsider and decide the case anew on 
its own merits. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 17, 
1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[Sac. No. 6232. In Bank. Mar. 21, 1952.] 
W. F. CONNER et al., Respondents, v. SOUTHERN P A-
CIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Appellants. 
[1] Railroads-Injuries From Operation-Questions of Law and 
Fact.-In action for wrongful death arising out of collision of 
train with a towed automobile which the deceased was steering, 
questions whether the railroad was negligent in the circum-
stances, whether any such negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident, and whether the deceased was guilty of negli-
gence which proximately contributed to cause the accident, 
were properly left to the jury. 
[2] Automobiles- Instructions-Contributory Negligence-Oper-
ator of Towed Vehicle.-In action for wrongful death of the 
operator of a towed automobile, the court is not bound to 
give an instruction that one guiding a towed vehicle has less 
control over its progress than does the driver of the towing 
vehicle, where no such instruction was requested; moreover, 
such fact is obvious without an instruction declaring it. 
[3] Id.- Instructions- Contributory Negligence- Operator of 
Towed Vehicle.-In action for the wrongful death of the oper-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Railroads, § 121(1); [2, 3] Automo-
blies, §343-1; [4] Railroads, §122(9); [5,6] New Trial, §124; 
[7] Railroads, §86(2); [8] Automobiles, § 139-1. 
